Nevada and the Market for Corporate Law
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Berle and Means altered the direction of debate on corporate governance by presenting evidence to suggest the owners of corporations did
not in fact control their corporations.1 In Berle and Means’s view, the
shareholders were too dispersed and uncoordinated to effectively exercise control so that power devolved to the non-owner agents charged
with managing the firm.
An important implication of Berle and Means’s book is that the
states could not be trusted to continue to regulate corporate governance.
If managers control their corporations, then they also effectively choose
the law that regulates corporate governance because the law of the state
where the firm chooses to incorporate governs the relationship between
the managers, the shareholders, and the corporation.2 It is not surprising
that Berle and Means’s work influenced the development of New Deal
legislation,3 including the Federal Securities Act of 19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 the first federal laws regulating corporate
governance. Stigler and Friedland note that “Samuel Rayburn, chairman
of the House Commerce Committee, presented the 1933 bill in language
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1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 304, 307 (1971).
3. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the ‘Modern Corporation,’ 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) (discussing the
influence of Adolf Berle, as well as Berle and Means’s book, on New Deal legislation generally).
4. Federal Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a−77z, 77aa.
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a−78z, 78aa−78pp.
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that could have been, and in a sense was, provided by Berle and
Means.”6
Where the stock is widely distributed, as in the case of so many
American corporations, the officials of the company, through the
use of proxies and the advantage they have in obtaining proxies, are
able to continue in office without much regard to their efficiency . . . . Two hundred companies own 75 percent of the total wealth
of the United States.
The management of these big corporations, as a rule, own an insignificant percentage of the outstanding voting stocks.7

The link between Berle and Means and the distrust of state law is
also evident in Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous 1933 dissent in Louis K.
Liggett Co. v. Lee:
The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a
small group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in
size by their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns
in which the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees
and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are
subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few
men. Ownership has been separated from control; and this separation has removed many of the checks which formerly operated to
curb the misuse of wealth and power . . . . Such is the Frankenstein
monster which states have created by their corporation laws.8

These ideas have retained a powerful hold on the popular and scholarly
imagination. More than forty years after Berle and Means, William Cary
denounced U.S. corporate law as a race to the bottom, with Delaware as
the “bottom,” where managers could use their power over the demand
side of the market to determine the nature of the law supplied by the
leading incorporation jurisdiction.9 Cary’s assertion that Delaware could
win incorporation business by attracting selfish managers and ignoring
shareholders has provided a powerful basis for federalization of corporate law.
6. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case of Berle &
Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 243 (1983). They also note, however, “the presumption is that the book
was at most a most minor influence on the formulation and passage of the security acts.” Id.
7. Id. (citing 4 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 2615–16 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1973)). They also note that the “two hundred corporations language,” contained in
Berle and Means’s book, reappeared in President Roosevelt’s letter to Rayburn asking for the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
8. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 564–67 (1933) (footnotes omitted).
9. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
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In the eighty years since the publication of Berle and Means’s book,
other ideas have risen to challenge its assumptions. Although the logic
that the dispersed many are weaker than the concentrated few may seem
compelling, the logic breaks down when one considers the market forces
that discipline corporate governance.10 Corporate executives have nothing to manage unless their firms can attract investments in highly competitive capital markets. Investors who are at the mercy of corporate
managers will demand a discount to reflect potential cheating. It follows
that the firms that can best protect their owners from cheating can raise
money at the lowest cost.11 In other words, managers must pay investors
for permission to cheat them. Investors can determine the likelihood of
cheating from firms’ disclosures about their managers and business. If
investors cannot trust firms’ disclosures, they will charge an additional
discount to reflect the risks imposed by poor information.12 In short, efficient securities markets discipline managers.
This logic extends to state law. Even if managers can choose the
governing state, they will pay a price for choosing a law that ignores
shareholders’ interests.13 Contrary to the assumption that Delaware is the
“bottom” in the competition for corporate law, evidence developed in
connection with the competing corporate finance thesis shows that investors actually pay more for firms that are incorporated in Delaware.14
Many scholars continue to share Cary’s skepticism that Delaware’s
dominance of the national market for corporate law15 indicates the exist-

10. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION 45–46 (2002); Henry G. Manne, Current Views on the “Modern Corporation,” 38 U. DET. L.J. 559, 583 (1961).
11. See ROMANO, supra note 10, at 46.
12. Id.
13. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
14. There is evidence that the stock market rewards firms that reincorporate in Delaware from
another jurisdiction. See ROMANO, supra note 10, at 64–75 (summarizing the results of empirical
studies examining stock price reaction to firms’ decision to reincorporate as “compelling evidence
that competition for corporate charters benefits investors”); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 (2001) (noting Delaware firms had higher “Tobin’s
Q’s” than non-Delaware firms between 1981 and 1996); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259
(1980) (noting firms earned positive stock market returns from reincorporating in Delaware).
15. The market for corporate law is now generally understood to consist of a “local” market in
which about half of publicly held firms choose their home state over Delaware and a “national”
market for out-of-state corporations that Delaware dominates. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does
the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002) (noting
Delaware has a 58% overall share of publicly traded nonfinancial firms); Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2002) (noting about half of Fortune
500 firms choose Delaware).
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ence of a healthy competition for corporate law.16 A leading explanation
that Delaware’s dominance is not evidence of a race to the top is based
on the hypothesis that the market for incorporations is least effective in
disciplining law that protects managers from threats to their control.17
This theory suggests that Delaware wins the state competition by providing takeover protection. Another leading theory suggests Delaware caters
to lawyers who constitute a powerful Delaware interest group responsible for crafting corporate law.18 There is also concern that Delaware’s
competitive edge, derived from its sophisticated legal infrastructure of
courts and lawyers,19 precludes effective competition. Even if the state
competition for corporate law does not produce optimal corporate law,
however, a question remains as to whether a monolithic and cumbersome
federal system could provide a sufficient improvement to justify displacing the current system.
This brief overview of the corporate federalism debate provides the
backdrop for analyzing recent papers on Nevada corporation law as the
first viable alternative to Delaware in the national market for out-of-state
incorporations.20 These papers argue that Nevada’s recent moves to impose lax director fiduciary duties and become a low-liability haven for
managers present a competitive threat to Delaware to which the latter
state may not be able to respond effectively. Evidence that Nevadaincorporated firms have a higher rate of issuing accounting restatements
seems to support the conclusion that Nevada is attracting managers of
firms with lax governance.21 This theory and evidence could renew concern about a potential race to the bottom.
We suggest an alternative version of what is happening in Nevada.
Instead of managers racing their firms to Nevada to take advantage of lax
fiduciary duties that make it easier for them to cheat, firms may be going
16. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later,
31 J. CORP. L. 779, 786–89 (2006) (reviewing the literature).
17. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 383, 405−06 (2003).
18. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 503−04 (1987).
19. See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). This explanation appears to be robust as to business form in light of
evidence of Delaware’s ability to dominate the competition for large limited liability companies. See
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for
Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 101.
20. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920538; Michal
Barzuza & David Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law (Va. Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 2011-08, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1644974.
21. Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20.
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to Nevada to reduce their costs of controlling cheating. Part of this strategy is based on Nevada’s use of lower cost, bright-line rules for imposing liability. Taking the costs of controlling cheating into account, Nevada law therefore actually may reduce rather than increase firms’ overall
costs of delegating power to agents. Evidence concerning a higher rate of
restatements by firms that incorporate in Nevada does not refute this alternative story. Furthermore, the availability of relatively lax fiduciary
duties in other jurisdictions, including Delaware, cast doubt on the race
for suboptimal laxity as the primary explanation for Nevada’s success.
In sum, the debate over Nevada essentially reduces to two accounts
of Nevada’s role in the market for corporate law. One view is that Nevada law is racing to the bottom by enabling corporate managers to escape
the discipline of fiduciary duties. Nevada thus can earn incorporation
fees for its taxpayers by disregarding the interests of out-of-state shareholders. Our alternative view is that Nevada provides a differentiated and
lower cost alternative corporate law that better fits the needs of some
firms and their shareholders.
This theory and evidence highlight the need to exercise caution before concluding that evidence from Nevada implies legal intervention is
warranted in the market for corporate law.22 This Article also suggests a
broader response to continued assertions that the Berle−Means hypothesis implies that strong federal law is necessary to deal with the separation
of ownership and control. The general lesson is that before concluding
that a significant federal regulatory expansion is necessary, it is important to consider carefully the reasons underlying firms’ choices and
the effectiveness of market mechanisms for disciplining bad choices.
Apart from Nevada’s implications for the federalization of corporate law, the appearance of a significant competitor to Delaware triggers
reevaluation of state competition for corporate law and consideration of
whether some legal reform might promote a broader and more efficient
set of corporate laws. In particular, given the appearance of Nevada, it is
worth asking why only Nevada, and why other states have not entered
the marketplace for corporate law with their own differentiated statutes.
The answer to this question may lie outside the box of state corporation
law in alternative business forms23 and private lawmaking.24
22. Note that our analysis is focused on corporate fiduciary duties. News stories also have
alleged that Nevada is a haven for corporate shells promoted by purveyors of tax avoidance and asset
protection devices. See, e.g., Brian Grow & Kelly Carr, Special Report: Nevada’s Big Bet on Secrecy, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/us-shellgames-nevada-idUSTRE78P1Y020110926. While these devices are indirectly relevant to this Article insofar as they relate to Nevada’s general reputation and market niche, they are legally distinct
from fiduciary duty provisions of corporate law.
23. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010).
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The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II presents the race-to-the-bottom view of Nevada law that is used to support
federalizing corporate law. Part III discusses the alternative view of Nevada’s role that raises doubts about whether Nevada is providing
suboptimally lax law and the use of Nevada law as a basis for federalization. Part IV examines the evidence on Nevada firms in light of the alternative hypotheses set out in Parts II and III. Part V discusses some limited evidence on the effect of Nevada reincorporation on shareholder
value. Part VI concludes.
II. RACE TO LAXITY
Under the hypothesis that Nevada represents a race to the bottom,
Nevada corporate law was revised to attract tax revenues by exploiting
manager and shareholder agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control. Nevada’s significant participation in the national
market for corporate law began in 2001 when Nevada changed its statutory rules defining the fiduciary liability of Nevada corporation directors
as part of a plan to significantly raise franchise taxes for Nevada corporations and to encourage corporations to pay the higher taxes.25 Under the
2001 law, Nevada directors and officers have mandatory liability only
for intentional misconduct and no other default or mandatory liability.26
Nevada corporation law provides, in relevant part, “Directors and officers shall exercise their powers in good faith and with a view to the interests of the corporation.”27 Except as otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation or certain provisions of the corporation law, however,
a director or officer is not individually liable to the corporation or
its stockholders or creditors for any damages as a result of any act
or failure to act in his capacity as a director or officer unless it is
proven that: (a) His act or failure to act constituted a breach of his
fiduciary duties as a director or officer; and (b) His breach of those
duties involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.28

In 2003, Nevada followed through on its plan to bolster revenue by
raising its maximum annual franchise tax from $85 to $11,100. These
changes combine with Nevada’s 1999 clarification of the business judg24. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law
Production (Ill. Program in Law, Behavior & Soc. Science Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884985.
25. See Barzuza, supra note 20.
26. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2011).
27. Id. § 78.138(1).
28. Id. § 78.138(7).
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ment rule’s application to takeover defenses that do not restrict shareholders’ voting rights.29
In order to assess Nevada’s role in the national market for corporate
law, it is necessary to compare Nevada with the leading competitor in
that market. Delaware default rules provide for the standard director fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.30 Most publicly held Delaware corporations, however, have taken advantage of a provision that allows a corporation to include in its articles of incorporation:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision
shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any
breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii)
under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.31

On the revenue side, Delaware provides for taxes of $75 to $180,000.32
It is important to emphasize that the difference between Nevada law
and Delaware law is not as stark as it might appear.33 As noted above, the
Nevada statute does impose a default fiduciary duty to act in good faith.
The Nevada Supreme Court explicitly recognized this duty in 2006 in a
case involving demand excuse in a shareholder derivative suit.34 The
court cited Delaware law throughout the opinion.35
The key difference between Delaware law and Nevada law lies in
the standard for imposing liability for breach of the standard fiduciary
duty. Under Nevada law, directors are liable only for a breach of fiduciary duty that involves “intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.”36 A conflict of interest transaction would breach Nevada’s
29. Id. § 78.139. The business judgment rule operates to give wide discretion to directors by
insulating their decisions from liability as long as the director rationally believed that the decision
was in the corporation’s best interests. See generally PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c)(3) (1994); Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, Directors’ Duties in Failing Firms, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 529, 532–33 (2006).
30. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2011).
31. Id. § 102(b)(7).
32. How to Calculate Franchise Taxes, STATE OF DEL., http://corp.delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.s
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
33. Indeed, other states also feature fiduciary duties that are more “lax” than Delaware. See,
e.g., Laurence V. Parker, Jr., Virginia is for Lovers and Directors: Important Differences Between
Fiduciary Duties in Virginia and Delaware, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 51, 58 (2011).
34. Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171 (Nev. 2006).
35. Id.
36. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2011).
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default fiduciary standard. It arguably follows that a deliberate breach of
this duty would constitute intentional misconduct or an act not in good
faith; therefore, the breach would fall outside Nevada’s exculpatory provision. Under Delaware law, corporations that opt out under section
102(b)(7) are liable not only for intentional misconduct, knowing violation of law, or improper personal benefit—all of which are arguably actionable in Nevada—but also for breach of the duty of loyalty or acts or
omissions that are not in good faith.37 These categories may involve conduct that is neither selfish nor intentionally wrongful, bordering on conduct protected by the business judgment rule.
The difference between Nevada law and Delaware law is highlighted by the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in Stone v. Ritter,38 which
held that a board’s conscious failure to adopt a compliance program in
the face of a known duty to act may constitute a breach of good faith that
survives a charter limitation on the board’s duty of care.39 It is unlikely
that such a claim would survive dismissal in Nevada because, assuming
Nevada law does not mandate a compliance program, managers’ failure
to adopt such a program may not amount to intentional misconduct.
Moreover, Nevada does not have an open-ended bad faith exception that
could catch this conduct like in Delaware. In other words, the key difference between Nevada and Delaware is not that Nevada managers have
no liability for wrongdoing, but that they are liable only when they know
they are engaging in wrongdoing.
Apart from the precise standard of liability in Nevada, the relevant
empirical question to ask in order to determine whether Nevada is facilitating a race to the bottom is whether firms’ opportunity to incorporate
under Nevada law injures shareholders. This question is deceivingly
complex. It is not enough that Nevada offers its managers a greater opportunity to cheat than other states’ laws. As discussed below in Part III,
shareholders might reasonably trade higher cheating costs for lower costs
of controlling cheating. Nor is Nevada law necessarily a problem if it
raises the cost of capital for Nevada firms compared to that of comparable firms incorporated under other states’ laws. If this were the case,
post-incorporation shareholders would not be harmed because they
would pay a lower price for their shares to reflect the possibility of managerial cheating.
The main concern here is for existing shareholders who have been
harmed by their managers’ decision to reincorporate in Nevada, perhaps
because they were misled by faulty proxy disclosures. At that point the
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2011).
38. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
39. Id. at 367.
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shareholders may be stuck with the choice of living with higher agency
costs, selling out for the lower price caused by the reincorporation, or
incurring the substantial expense of removing the managers or otherwise
forcing a move out of Nevada. Nevada’s corporate law can contribute to
the risk of poor governance by offering managers an opportunity to escape monitoring that would not exist in other states.40
It is difficult to definitively determine whether a particular state’s
corporate law provision reduces shareholder welfare in the context of a
generally competitive market for corporate law. If shareholders generally
are getting what they pay for, offering investors an additional governance
choice may be worth the risk to shareholders who are injured by transition to the new law. But there may be a point at which a state’s corporate
law offers so little potential benefit to the overall market that it is not
worth the risk of injury to some shareholders. Part III addresses this concern by considering Nevada’s potential contribution to the overall market
for corporate law. This analysis is important in determining whether the
Nevada statute supports imposing federal minimum standards or other
regulation.
III. EFFICIENT MARKET SEGMENTATION
Part II presents the worst case for Nevada—it provides a refuge for
inefficiently lax governance. This Part discusses an alternative or additional perspective on Nevada law—it provides a mechanism for reducing
agency costs. Nevada law reduces agency costs by tailoring managers’
fiduciary duties to fit both the type of firm that chooses Nevada law and
the Nevada courts’ institutional capacity to judge whether corporate
agents have met these duties. Policymakers must evaluate both the perspective set out in Part II and the alternative perspective set out in this
Part before deciding the implications of Nevada corporate law for federalizing corporate law.
A. Agency Costs and State Corporate Law
An important objective of corporate law is to promote contractual
provisions that minimize agency costs. This principle is not the same as
minimizing the amount of cheating by agents. Rather, agency costs are
better understood as the total costs of owners delegating control over the
management of property to agents, thereby separating control from ownership of the property. These costs include not only losses from agent
cheating, but also principals and agents’ monitoring and bonding costs of
40. See infra Part V for an attempt to empirically test the effect of reincorporation on stock
prices.
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reducing the risk of loss.41 For example, a principal could reduce agent
cheating by watching everything the agent does or by reducing the
agent’s discretion. Nevertheless, this approach could increase total agency costs because the costs of watching the agent or reducing the value of
the agent’s exercise of discretion exceed the benefits of reduced cheating. Agency costs, defined as the costs of hiring an agent, are never zero
because the incentive problem inherent in separating ownership and control requires either incurring the costs of controlling cheating or leaving
the agent free to cheat. At the same time, there may be significant benefits associated with delegating to agents, particularly in situations where
agency costs are highest—that is, where numerous and dispersed principals must delegate control to a central authority because of the impossibility of effectively coordinating decision-making.
In evaluating the efficiency of state corporate law, it is important to
keep in mind that law is just one of many potential ways principals have
to reduce agent cheating. State-imposed fiduciary duties involve ex post
judicial review of fiduciary conduct and judicially enforced damages and
equitable relief for misconduct. Principals could supplement or substitute
for these duties, among other things, shareholder approval of agents’
acts, incentive compensation to align agents’ incentives with the firm’s
interests, shareholder transfer or exit rights, and review of agent conduct
by independent directors, auditors, or lawyers. Principals could also rely
on market mechanisms such as price signals in product and securities
markets, markets for corporate control and managerial services, and reputational incentives. Judicially enforced contract provisions, rather than
default or mandatory rules in state corporate law, could provide some of
these terms. The federal securities laws provide additional mandatory
penalties for fraud, nondisclosure, and other misconduct. This helps ensure that shareholders have the facts about how well their firms are governed. Federal law also provides some minimum governance standards
for publicly held firms.42 In short, the efficiency of state corporate law
depends on its marginal costs and benefits in controlling agent cheating
given other constraints on agency costs.
An additional consideration in assessing state corporate law is that
firms have differing governance needs. Firms with concentrated shareholdings or majority or controlling shareholders may have very different
agency cost control problems from firms with widely dispersed share41. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West 2002); HENRY N. BUTLER &
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT
(2006).
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holders. Firms may select the rules that fit their needs not only by entering into customized contracts but also by choosing a suitable organizational form or state law.43 It follows that state competition may be efficient even if it does not produce a single superior “winner,” but rather a
mix of laws that is suitable for different types of firms.44
Nevada law can be further analyzed in terms of error costs. Even if
fiduciary duties might seem to add a necessary constraint on cheating,
these duties still may not be efficient in the real world in which human
judges decide fiduciary duty cases. Lax fiduciary standards could lead to
“Type II” errors, meaning the standards allow more cheating than the
shareholders would prefer.45 On the other hand, Nevada law could also
reduce “Type I” errors by reducing liability that might motivate managers to engage in acts that do not benefit shareholders such as non-costjustified monitoring or avoiding risky but positive net present value business decisions.46
The risk of Type I error is compounded by agency costs in litigating
fiduciary breaches. Courts must determine, in hindsight, whether business judgments that turn out poorly were reasonably made under the circumstances. The risk of error may be compounded by another set of
agents, plaintiffs’ lawyers, who can earn fees for bringing marginal cases
that survive dismissal even if these cases cause net harm to shareholders.47 Thus, restricting fiduciary duties in order to reduce error costs
could improve efficiency even when fiduciary duties provide efficient
discipline in an ideal world.
B. Nevada’s Strategy
This section examines Nevada law’s approach to agency costs in
light of the analysis discussed above. As emphasized in Part II, the key
difference between Nevada law and Delaware law is that Nevada law
imposes liability for a breach of fiduciary duty only when the defendant
43. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 23.
44. Id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of
Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 179 (1985).
45. Type II errors are also known as “false negatives.” In the context of enforcement of a legal
rule, a Type II error occurs when there is an erroneous finding of no liability, or in the criminal context, when the guilty are allowed to go free. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
218 (6th ed. 2003).
46. Type I errors are also known as “false positives.” In the context of enforcement of a legal
rule, a Type I error occurs when there is an erroneous finding of liability, or in the criminal context,
when the innocent are falsely convicted. Id.
47. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter
More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627
(2007).
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knows she is breaching a legal duty. Nevada law thus ensures that Nevada courts have a limited ability to second-guess business decisions. Nevada’s intentional misconduct standard alleviates the indeterminacy
problem that plagues Delaware judges’ attempts to draw fine lines between business decisions that do and do not warrant special judicial attention.48 This reflects a tradeoff between the benefits of strict discipline
of fiduciary misconduct and the potential costs of excessive error from
judicial monitoring.49
Analysis of Nevada’s competitive strategy must explain not only
how Nevada’s supposed laxity attracts out-of-state incorporations but
also how it can maintain its competitive advantage, despite charging
more for incorporation than any state in the country other than Delaware
while lacking Delaware’s substantial infrastructure and long-standing
reputation. The problem for Nevada is that it cannot copyright its law, so
any state could pass the same law and charge a lower price.50 And unlike
Delaware, Nevada has no obvious institutional or reputational mechanism to protect it from such price-cutting competition.51 It would seem
that another state could take over Nevada’s leadership as a Delaware alternative just as swiftly as Delaware took over New Jersey’s spot in the
early days of the corporate competition in the United States.52
One explanation for the unique success of Nevada’s strategy is that
it not only attracts firms by enacting beneficial corporate law, but Nevada is also able to credibly bond its promise to refrain from materially
changing the law after corporations have incurred the costs of incorporating in the state. Nevada’s dependence on the substantial future revenues

48. See William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12−17 (arguing that Delaware law suffers from excessive indeterminacy); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1908 (1998) (arguing that indeterminacy enhances Delaware’s competitive
position); Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 503−04 (arguing that the complexity of Delaware law
serves lawyers’ interests by increasing litigation).
49. The point here is not that Nevada law reduces the risk of “frivolous” lawsuits that have a
low likelihood of liability. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 37. Rather, it guards against Type I error
by narrowing the situations in which liability can be imposed to those that can be avoided at a relatively low cost. For a similar explanation of the mens rea requirement in criminal law, see Jeffrey S.
Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993).
50. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1169 (2011) (discussing lack of property rights in law); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 24
(same).
51. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L.
REV. 299 (2004).
52. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Charter-Mongering, 1875−1929, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 677 (1989).
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generated by its unique law acts as a reputational bond that makes it politically difficult for the legislature to change the standard ex post.53
There is an additional question of why Nevada chooses to compete
with Delaware on the low end of monitoring rather than by offering a
stricter law. One explanation is that Nevada’s bright-line approach to
liability meshes well with Nevada’s legal infrastructure of judges and
lawyers. Delaware corporate judges are adept at writing extensive opinions, sometimes on a tight schedule that analyze corporate transactions
with care and expertise. These decisions must distinguish between acceptable business judgment at the time of the decision and a violation of
the applicable legal standards in the particular case. Judges also must
prescribe governance practices that are both realistic and effective and fit
the case into the complex network of existing Delaware law. In order to
do their job, even the most expert judges rely on comparably expert advocates to navigate this process. Indeed, Delaware judges are drawn from
the ranks of the Delaware bar. By contrast, Nevada, like other states
aside from Delaware, lacks a comparable corporate law infrastructure
and is unlikely to acquire such an infrastructure without either first attracting the high-end incorporation business or making a substantial investment in infrastructure on the gamble that the business will come.
Delaware faces the converse problem from Nevada. Because Delaware has invested in a high-level infrastructure, it can maintain its competitive advantage only by applying legal rules that use this infrastructure. If Delaware were to imitate Nevada’s bright-line approach, it would
effectively devalue its costly infrastructure and sacrifice its main competitive advantage. In other words, Nevada and Delaware are essentially in
two distinct businesses—low infrastructure coupled with bright-line rules
versus high infrastructure coupled with flexible standards of corporate
law.
There are many other states that lack Delaware’s infrastructure that
could enact corporate law provisions similar to Nevada and generate similar assurances against change; Nevada, however, has two unique characteristics that complement its low-monitoring strategy and thereby enable
it to out-compete other states. First, Nevada’s ability to provide assurance that it will not change its laws is supported by its relatively sparse
population. This makes it more dependent on incorporation fees than
more populous states. Second, Nevada can successfully compete against
other small states because its general reputation, based on a large and
successful gambling industry, reduces the likelihood of political backlash

53. See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
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based on public concern that lax corporate law will cast the state in a bad
light.
Nevada’s strategy also has implications for the types of firms for
which Nevada could be expected to compete. In general, firms could be
expected to choose Delaware law if they want to offer investors strong
assurances that they are making substantial investments in monitoring.
Consistent with our agency cost analysis above, firms would select Delaware when the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs of such additional monitoring. Two characteristics of Nevada firms are consistent
with a demand for lower levels of monitoring. First, Nevada public firms
are smaller than those in Delaware. This characteristic alone increases
the per capitalization cost of establishing controls to catch accounting
errors. Indeed, small size is one of the factors generally associated with
weaker controls.54 Second, Nevada has a relatively high percentage of
family firms.55 Such firms are generally directly controlled by their
shareholders and therefore need not rely on auditors and disclosure to
discipline managers. John Coffee attributes the presence of fewer accounting scandals in Europe than in the United States following the 2001
stock market crash to basic differences between European and U.S. firms
with respect to shareholder concentration.56 U.S.-style dispersed shareholder firms are more likely to rely on option compensation, which increases the risk of revenue-recognition problems.57 The relatively high
percentage of family firms in Nevada suggests that Nevada firms are
more like those in Europe than those incorporated in Delaware.
C. Choice of Form
Section B discusses reasons why Nevada is able to secure a position
as a key competitor to Delaware in the market for corporate law. But an
alternative scenario is competition in the market for noncorporate business forms. Indeed, Delaware is already competing successfully by offering uncorporate (limited partnership and LLC) law that is laxer than Nevada corporate law, in addition to access to Delaware’s superior infrastructure,58 all at a significantly lower price than both Nevada and Dela-

54. See Jeffrey T. Doyle, Weili Ge & Sarah E. McVay, Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial Reporting, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 193, 193−94 (2007).
55. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 41.
56. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ, 21
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005).
57. See id.
58. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 131, 133.
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ware corporate law.59 The uncorporate alternative provides further support for the proposition that the Nevada phenomenon is not simply a
competition over laxity, but rather a more nuanced competition over the
nature of agency cost control and the role of legal infrastructure.
Delaware’s limited partnership and LLC statutes provide for near
complete opt-out from all fiduciary duties, comparable to the freedom
under the Nevada corporate statute. For example, Delaware’s limited
partnership statute provides:
(d) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a partner or other person
has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise
bound by a partnership agreement, the partner’s or other person’s
duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in
the partnership agreement; provided that the partnership agreement
may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
(e) Unless otherwise provided in a partnership agreement, a partner
or other person shall not be liable to a limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise
bound by a partnership agreement for breach of fiduciary duty for
the partner’s or other person’s good faith reliance on the provisions
of the partnership agreement.
(f) A partnership agreement may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other person to a
limited partnership or to another partner or to another person that is
a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement; provided that a partnership agreement may not limit or eliminate liability
for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.60

Notably, the Delaware uncorporate statutes, unlike both Nevada and
Delaware corporate law, provide for complete waiver of fiduciary duties,
leaving only the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Delaware’s courts have confirmed that these statutes do indeed allow complete waiver of default fiduciary duties, leaving only a contractual duty that is defined with reference to the parties’ contracts.61 These
59. Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and
Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 191, 198−209 (2011) (discussing the implications of the
different pricing of Delaware corporations and uncorporations).
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (West 2010) (applying to LPs). A similar provision
applies to LLCs. See id. § 18-1101.
61. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 143.
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features of Delaware uncorporations come at a much lower price than
either Nevada or Delaware incorporation.62
Delaware uncorporate law provides additional insights into state
competition for business association law in general and Nevada corporation law in particular. As noted above, a key difference between Delaware and other states with regard to both corporate and uncorporate law
is legal infrastructure. Delaware uncorporate law demands a substantial
infrastructure for interpreting agreements that dispense with the rich
background of fiduciary duties.63 The Delaware uncorporate alternative
also raises the question of why firms need to go to Nevada to opt out of
liability for unintentional breach of fiduciary duty when they can completely avoid fiduciary duties through Delaware uncorporate law.64 The
wide availability of lax corporation and uncorporation law in jurisdictions other than Nevada supports the above explanation of Nevada law
based on error costs rather than laxity.65
IV. DID NEVADA ATTRACT MISCREANTS? EVIDENCE
FROM RESTATEMENTS
Part III shows that the Nevada statute can be explained as a way to
reasonably economize on agency costs rather than more simplistically as
a platform for managers to cheat shareholders. But this benign explanation for Nevada law does not eliminate the possibility that—whatever its
strategy—Nevada is in fact a haven for cheaters and therefore contributes
to a race to the bottom in the market for corporate law. Part IV addresses
this argument by analyzing the evidence regarding the types of firms that
are incorporating in Nevada.

62. See Manesh, supra note 59.
63. For an analysis of these cases, see Ribstein, supra note 58, at 143−61. Indeed, this indeterminacy could be as much a problem for uncorporations as for corporations. See id. at 165–66. This
has prompted Delaware’s Chief Justice Steele to suggest that Delaware should dispense with default
fiduciary duties, a change that would move Delaware uncorporate law even beyond Nevada corporate law in laxity. Myron Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in the Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 238−41 (2009);
see also Larry E. Ribstein, Should There Be Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs and LPs?,
TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Dec. 9, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/12/09/should-there-bedefault-fiduciary-duties-in-delaware-llcs-and-lps/.
64. In fact, shedding fiduciary duties makes more sense for uncorporations, which trade these
duties for other agency cost control mechanisms, particularly including exit and high-powered managerial incentives. See generally RIBSTEIN, supra note 23.
65. Delaware’s embrace of open-ended contracting for fiduciary duties raises doubts about
Barzuza’s argument that Delaware would hesitate to compete with Nevada for laxity in corporate
law for fear of diluting its brand or increasing the possibility of federal regulation. See Barzuza,
supra note 20, at 25–28.
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Barzuza and Smith approach this determination by using firms’ accounting restatements as a proxy for bad governance.66 They find that
firms incorporated in Nevada between 2000 and 2008, mostly after Nevada changed its law, have a 40% higher likelihood of issuing a restatement than those incorporated in Delaware and other states during this
period after controlling for various firm-level characteristics. They note
that accounting restatements involve an admission by the firm that its
previous accounting was materially inaccurate, as shown by data indicating a strong negative market reaction to restatement issuance.67 Barzuza
and Barzuza and Smith also cite data that they argue support the link between restatements and lax governance.68
Note that Barzuza does not claim that Nevada law causes or even
permits more accounting restatements.69 Indeed, Barzuza and Smith
found no evidence of increased restatements following reincorporation
under Nevada’s lax provisions.70 But Nevada corporations’ higher likelihood of restatements may indicate that Nevada’s lax law attracts poorly
governed firms. On the other hand, as emphasized throughout this Article, a higher probability of an accounting restatement may simply reflect
a rational corporate decision to reduce overall agency costs by investing
fewer resources in monitoring.71 The question then is whether Nevada
firms’ high level of restatements indicates that they are poorly governed
not simply because they optimally invest less in monitoring than other
firms, but because they choose a level of monitoring that decreases firm
value. This depends on the type of restatements prevalent among Nevada
66. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20. Firms file restated financial statements to correct
errors in the statements previously submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See
Kristen L. Anderson & Teri Lombardi Yohn, The Effect of 10K Restatements on Firm Value, Information Asymmetries, and Investors’ Reliance on Earnings (Sept. 2002) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=332380.
67. Anderson & Yohn, supra note 66; Coffee, supra note 56.
68. William R. Baber et al., Shareholder Rights, Corporate Governance and Accounting Restatement, (Feb. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=760324 (noting restating firms have less exposure to the market for control and
shareholder discipline); Jap Efendi, Anup Srivastava & Edward P. Swanson, Why Do Corporate
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors, 85
J. FIN. ECON. 667 (2007) (link between restatements and CEO in-the-money stock options); Michael
Ettredge et al., How Do Restatements Begin? Evidence of Earnings Management Preceding Restated
Financial Reports, 37 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 332 (2010) (restatements tend to reflect balance sheet
bloating); see Simi Kedia & Thomas Philippon, The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting, 22 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2169 (2009) (linking restatements and worse governance as reflected by governance
indices).
69. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at 21–22 (discussing regressions in Table 8 that include firm-level fixed effects).
70. Id.
71. Indeed, they find that Nevada firms are much less likely to use Big 4 audit firms at the time
of the restatement and generally rely on smaller, regional accounting firms. Id. at tbl.4.
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firms and the connection between these restatements and firm governance.
For several reasons, the Nevada restatements noted by Barzuza and
Smith do not necessarily indicate a high prevalence of fraud, as distinguished from mistakes that could result from a decision not to invest in
stringent monitoring. First, the raw data indicate that while Nevada firms
are about 60% more likely than other states to require restatements, they
are only marginally more likely than Delaware firms to involve fraud
allegations or an investigation by regulators (1.3% versus 1.2%).72 This
is not surprising given that federal law primarily disciplines accounting
fraud.
Second, even the restatements accompanied by fraud allegations
may not indicate excessively low monitoring that would result in reductions in firm value. Alleging accounting restatements has become a significant way to escape dismissal in the wake of the higher pleading
standards under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).73
Because such cases are much more likely to be filed, some of the filed
cases alleging fraud will be Type I errors. The PSLRA’s heightened
pleading requirement therefore may tend to exaggerate restatements’ association with fraud allegations in the post-PSLRA data used by Barzuza
and Smith.
Third, the data do not indicate that Nevada restatements are the
types of restatements particularly associated with fraud. Nevada firms
lost less income as a result of restatements than firms in other states, including Delaware,74 suggesting that Nevada firms with bad accounting
are less prone to inflating income than firms with bad accounting in other
states. Revenue recognition in particular has been most directly associated with poor controls.75 Barzuza and Smith’s random sample of restatements76 indicates a variety of problems that do not point to a particular
propensity for fraud. Indeed, Barzuza notes, “We found that no one type
of restatements dominates Nevada companies in a way that could explain
the frequencies of such restatements.”77 The summary reveals accounting
errors that, for example, “do not reflect a net gain or benefit from certain
72. Id. at tbl.3, panel A. Note, however, that there is a positive and significant Nevada effect on
fraud allegations in the regressions. See id. at tbl.6, panel C.
73. See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009); Johnson, Nelson &
Pritchard, supra note 47.
74. See Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax
Law, at tbl.3, panel B (October 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
75. See Anderson & Yohn, supra note 66; Coffee, supra note 56.
76. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at app. tbl.A3.
77. Barzuza, supra note 20, at n.156.
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embedded derivative securities”; “did not affect the Company’s earnings
or net worth”; “[reflect] an adjustment of $79,750 which had been erroneously included in paid-up capital rather than shareholder loans”; and
“inadvertently failed to record the appropriate expense for such Options
in accordance with FAS 123(R).”78
Fourth, the association between Nevada incorporation and restatements may be consistent with firms selecting Nevada because they incur
high costs or derive lower benefits from monitoring. For example, Nevada firms may be more volatile than other types of firms. Volatility has
been found to be a stronger predictor than size of internal controls weakness.79 Volatile firms are inherently subject to more influences on earnings variation and therefore may have to invest more in monitoring and
accounting controls to avoid restatements. A high propensity for restatements in these firms therefore may reflect economizing on monitoring
rather than a likelihood of fraud.
Fifth, Barzuza’s emphasis on accounting restatements assumes a
link between restatements and weak governance. This assumption arguably supports the inference that managers of weakly governed firms use
their power to incorporate in Nevada in order to take advantage of weak
ex post judicial scrutiny of their conduct. Indeed, stronger external governance, such as takeover discipline, has been associated with fewer accounting restatements.80 Barzuza and Smith, however, find that Nevada
firms actually do not have worse governance than firms incorporated in
other states as shown by the “G” and “E” governance indices.81 In Nevada, the lack of a correlation between governance indices and restatements
is consistent with other data showing that governance is no more than
weakly related to accounting restatements.82 This lack of correlation, in
turn, counters the suggestion that the prevalence of restatements in Nevada indicates that poorly governed firms are flocking to the state.
V. EFFECT OF NEVADA INCORPORATION ON FIRM VALUE
The price investors are willing to pay for Nevada corporations is
the ultimate test of whether there is a problem with Nevada law. The val78. Id.
79. See Cindy R. Alexander & Kathleen Weiss Hanley, Regulatory Monitoring Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Oct. 2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1022161.
80. See Baber et al., supra note 68.
81. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at tbl.5. The E index, which includes antitakeover
defenses, is lower in Nevada than in Delaware or the average of states other than Nevada or Delaware. The Nevada G index is higher.
82. See David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson & Irem Tuna, Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance, 83 ACCT. REV. 963 (2007).
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ue of Nevada firms compared to comparable firms incorporated elsewhere could indicate the market’s evaluation of Nevada law’s tradeoff
between costs and benefits of monitoring.
Barzuza and Smith show that Nevada corporations do not have a
lower Tobin’s Q than those incorporated in states other than Delaware or
Nevada, although Nevada incorporation has a less favorable effect on
Tobin’s Q than Delaware incorporation, which is associated with increased value.83 Barzuza recognizes, however, that Tobin’s Q may be an
unreliable reflection of shareholder value, particularly in small firms.84
Moreover, Nevada firms’ Tobin’s Q may reflect characteristics not controlled for in the regressions rather than the effect of Nevada incorporation.
The most direct evidence of what Nevada law adds or subtracts
from the value of firms incorporated there would be an event study
showing shareholders’ reactions to a publicly held firm’s decision to reincorporate to Nevada from some other state.85 But data that would allow
one to examine the stock price effects of Nevada reincorporations are
sparse. Our research disclosed few publicly held corporations that reincorporated from another state to Nevada after 2001 for which there was
sufficient event and stock price data to enable such an event study.86
While the lack of data limits the general inferences that can be made,87
we present data from one firm, Dynacq Healthcare (Dynacq), to illustrate
the potential costs and benefits of alternative approaches to the reduction
of total agency costs discussed in Part III above and to highlight the need
for better and more complete data on small firms.
Indeed, apart from its potentially limited use as the basis for a statistical study, Dynacq’s corporate history usefully illustrates some of the
costs facing a small firm incorporated in Delaware, as well as the problems of inferring that Nevada law is suboptimally lax. Dynacq initially
83. See Barzuza & Smith, supra note 20, at tbl.11. Tobin’s Q equals the ratio of the market
value of a firm’s assets to the book value of a firm’s assets and is used as a measure of financial
performance. Id. at 14.
84. See Barzuza, supra note 20, at 46.
85. See Romano, supra note 14.
86. We began with a list of 319 firms that had reincorporated to Nevada after its 2001 corporate law revisions. Dynacq Healthcare was the only firm in which stock price data and specific event
data, including the board meeting date on which the decision to reincorporate was made, was simultaneously available.
87. The lack of a substantial number of firms with usable data would raise questions regarding
the external validity of any results obtained from a statistical study of the abnormal returns around
the announcement of the firm’s decision to reincorporate to Nevada (i.e., the ability to generalize any
results obtained). See Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 786 (2008) (discussing these issues in the context of a single firm event study). There are also issues with respect to
the internal validity of any results that are discussed infra in note 91.
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incorporated under the laws of Nevada. Thus, the firm began with the
low-cost and low-infrastructure Nevada strategy. In 2003, the firm reincorporated under Delaware law and hired a “big four” accounting firm
(Ernst & Young). The firm’s transition to the higher-cost and highinfrastructure Delaware strategy did not go smoothly. The move exposed
Dynacq’s low levels of internal controls. Soon after reincorporating in
Delaware, the company was forced to delay the filing of its quarterly and
annual reports. Ernst & Young resigned as its auditor, and Dynacq was
forced to restate its earnings for the years 1999 through 2002.88 Delisting
from NASDAQ and a round of class action lawsuits followed.89
While the move to Delaware and the hiring of a big four accounting
firm exposed Dynacq’s low level of internal controls and forced it to restate its earnings, this does not necessarily imply that its initial choice of
Nevada law or its low level of internal controls was suboptimal. Indeed,
the firm subsequently reversed its 2003 decision to reincorporate under
Delaware law by reincorporating under Nevada law in 2006.90
This 2006 decision offers a potential opportunity to test between the
two accounts of Nevada law presented in Parts II and III. It allows us to
88. The Dynacq restatements are similar to those discussed supra in the text accompanying
notes 75 and 76. Specifically, none of the restatements resulted in reductions in reported net revenue,
cash flows from operating activities, or stockholders’ equity. See Press Release, Dynacq Healthcare,
Inc., Dynacq Healthcare, Inc. Announces Changes in Previously Reported Financial Results and
Provides Litigation Update (July 14, 2004), available at http://www.dynacq.com/NewsItem.cfm
?ItemID=23.
89. These suits were the second set of class action lawsuits filed against Dynacq and resulted in
a settlement in 2007 for 1.5 million dollars, an amount that included the payment to the class, as well
as all administrative costs and attorneys’ fees. These suits are summarized at Stanford Law School
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, DYNACQ HEALTHCARE, INC., http://securities.stanford.edu/
1029/DYIIE03-01/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). The prior set of class action lawsuits occurred in
2002 during the firm’s first incorporation in Nevada. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2003 prior to
Dynacq’s reincorporation to Delaware. These suits are summarized at id., http://securities.stan
ford.edu/1023/DYII02-01/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
90. In its proxy statement, Dynacq states the “principal reason for reincorporation from Delaware to Nevada is to eliminate our obligation to pay the annual Delaware franchise tax which will
result in significant savings to us in the future.” The proxy statement also notes that a
potential disadvantage of reincorporating from Delaware to Nevada is that Delaware for
many years has followed a policy of encouraging incorporation in that state and, in furtherance of that policy, has adopted comprehensive, modern and flexible corporate laws
that Delaware periodically updates and revises to meet changing business needs. Because
of Delaware’s prominence as a state of incorporation for many large corporations, the
Delaware courts have developed considerable expertise in dealing with corporate issues
and a substantial body of case law has developed construing Delaware law and establishing public policies with respect to Delaware corporations. By reincorporating in Nevada,
we may experience less predictability with respect to management of our corporate affairs.
Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, DYNACQ
HEALTHCARE, INC., available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/890908/00011931250626
1075/ddef14a.htm.
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perform a single firm event study based on the firm’s stock price reaction
to its decision to reincorporate under Nevada law. With a null hypothesis
that shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate to Nevada, the two accounts of Nevada law yield two alternative hypotheses.
The first is that the Nevada reincorporation is the result of the firm managers’ self-serving decision to move to a jurisdiction with lax controls.
Under this race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, the announcement of the decision to reincorporate from Delaware to Nevada should result in negative
abnormal returns to shareholders. The second alternative hypothesis is
that the decision to reincorporate reflects the managers’ choice to move
to a lower cost jurisdiction in order to minimize overall monitoring costs.
Under this hypothesis, the reincorporation announcement should result in
positive abnormal returns to shareholders.
Figure 1 shows the abnormal returns surrounding the board’s 2006
decision to reincorporate in Nevada. We could not reject the null hypothesis that shareholders were unaffected by the decision to reincorporate,
as there is no evidence of statistically significant negative or positive abnormal returns generated by the announcement of the firm’s decision to
reincorporate under Nevada law.91 Specifically, using a two-tailed nonparametric SQ test with a standard .05 significance level, there are no
statistically significant abnormal returns on or around the proxy mailing
date or the date the shareholders approved the move back to Nevada.92
91. Event studies based on small numbers of firms pose special problems resulting from the
greater volatility experienced by a portfolio of a small number of firms and the fact that the assumption of normally distributed abnormal returns assumed in conventional hypothesis testing may not
approximate the actual distribution of returns. See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 87, at 810. These
problems are exacerbated when looking at a portfolio made up of a single small firm. Indeed, a plot
of the abnormal return from the estimation period of the Dynacq market model indicates these returns were not normally distributed. In the statistical tests reported in this Article, we used a nonparametric SQ test to adjust for the possibility of abnormally distributed abnormal returns. For a discussion of this test and its use in single firm event studies, see Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies (Jan. 6, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442222.
92. Given the two alternative hypotheses, using a two-tailed test is appropriate. Our nonfinding
with respect to the existence of statistically significant abnormal returns and the high volatility associated with our portfolio of a single small firm do generate concerns regarding the potentially limited
power of our test (the inability of our statistical test to correctly reject the null hypothesis of no effect
when the alternative hypothesis that Nevada reincorporation harms shareholders is true). For a general discussion of these issues, see STEVEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES (2007);
Deirdre N. McCloskey & Stephen T. Ziliak, The Standard Error of Regressions, 34 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 97 (1996). For example, our test would not detect a 13% negative abnormal return that
was caused by Dynacq’s decision to reincorporate under Nevada law. Increasing the significance
level can increase the power of our test. Indeed, there is a single 10.34% negative abnormal return on
the date of board meeting where the decision to reincorporate back to Nevada was made that is statistically significant if a .10 significance level is used. But there is reason to question whether this
large magnitude negative abnormal return signals the market’s reaction to the decision to reincorpo-
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Figure 1 – Dynacq Healthcare (DYII) Abnormal Returns

Thus, while the single firm event study gives us a limited opportunity to test shareholder reaction to Nevada versus Delaware incorporation, the results obtained fail to provide evidence that would clarify this
issue.93 The most that we can say at this time is that there is a general
absence of direct stock price evidence regarding the validity of a Nevada
race-to-the-bottom theory.
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The 2001 Nevada corporate law amendments reignited the specter
of a race to the bottom in corporate law raised by Cary and suggested a
need for federal corporation law advocated by Cary and Berle and
Means. But we have provided a benign explanation for Nevada law that
emphasizes a firm’s decision to reduce agency costs by choosing costeffective mechanisms for monitoring agents. Rather than supporting federalization, Nevada corporation law indicates the depth and complexity
rate to Nevada. Specifically, this date precedes the public disclosure date, and there is no evidence of
any insider selling on or around the date of the board meeting.
93. In addition, we performed an event study examining Dynacq Healthcare’s earlier 2003
decision to reincorporate from Nevada to Delaware. We find no evidence of significant positive
abnormal returns generated by announcement of the firm’s decision to reincorporate from Nevada to
Delaware.
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of the state law market for monitoring and therefore an important cost of
one-size-fits-all devices for controlling agency costs.
Data on the causes and effects of Nevada incorporation could
change this conclusion; the data so far, however, are sparse and inconclusive. This raises the question of the appropriate burden of proof in
problems related to state law that could warrant federal control. Even if
some evidence were to indicate that Nevada was providing a refuge for
inefficiently governed firms, it is not clear that this would justify outlawing experimentation in the market for state law. Problems with a firstmover state like Nevada are likely to be sufficiently salient that shareholders in Nevada corporations know what they are getting. As long as
the market applies an appropriate discount, there is room for Nevadatype experimentation.
All of this is not to say that the market for corporate law functions
perfectly. In particular, it is still not clear why there are only two competitors in this market, why one of these competitors is dominant, and why
there is not more diversity in state corporate law. We have elsewhere
suggested that the problem may lie in government legislators’ weak incentives to innovate and the limited and skewed incentives for private
parties’ participation in the market for business association standard
forms.94 If private actors had stronger property rights in law, they might
have an incentive to create a variety of different standard forms that
states could adopt. There might then be more alternative standard forms
and more variations on each standard form.
In general, the market is still learning about what does and does not
work in corporate governance. Just as Berle and Means’s warning of the
dangers of separating ownership and control have given rise to a large
literature that demonstrates the offsetting benefits of this separation and
how the dangers that result can be addressed, so too has Cary’s warning
about Delaware’s race to the bottom spawned theories and evidence concerning the benefits of the market for corporate law. We should now be
skeptical about substituting Nevada for Delaware as the new “bottom,”
and we should wait for more evidence that Nevada represents a systematic problem before attempting to regulate it.

94. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 24.

